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Abstract
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) refers to a set of
encryption schemes that allow computations to be applied
directly on encrypted data without requiring a secret key.
This enables novel application scenarios where a client can
safely offload storage and computation to a third-party cloud
provider without having to trust the software and the hard-
ware vendors with the decryption keys. Recent advances in
both FHE schemes and implementations have moved such
applications from theoretical possibilities into the realm of
practicalities.
This paper proposes a compact and well-reasoned inter-
face called the Homomorphic Instruction Set Architecture
(HISA) for developing FHE applications. Just as the hard-
ware ISA interface enabled hardware advances to proceed
independent of software advances in the compiler and lan-
guage runtimes, HISA decouples compiler optimizations and
runtimes for supporting FHE applications from advancements
in the underlying FHE schemes.
This paper demonstrates the capabilities of HISA by build-
ing an end-to-end software stack for evaluating neural network
models on encrypted data. Our stack includes an end-to-end
compiler, runtime, and a set of optimizations. Our approach
shows generated code, on a set of popular neural network
architectures, is faster than hand-optimized implementations.
1. Introduction
Many applications benefit from storing and computing on data
in the cloud. Cloud providers centralize and manage compute
and storage resources, which lets developers focus on the logic
of their application and not on how to deploy and manage the
infrastructure that surrounds it. A large class of applications,
however, have strict data secrecy and privacy requirements
ranging from government regulations to gaining competitive
advantage from consumer protection. In these cases, data se-
crecy and privacy issues end up limiting otherwise convenient
cloud adoption.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows computa-
tions to be applied directly on encrypted data and thus enables
a wide variety of cloud applications that may not be available
today. A cloud based FHE application encrypts its plaintext
input a and stores it in encrypted form in cloud storage as α .
At a later time, the application requests the cloud to perform an
FHE operation f on the encrypted data α and to store the (still
encrypted) result β = f (α). The application can download
β from cloud storage at any point and decrypt the result to
obtain a plaintext result b = f (a).
FHE provides a simple trust model: the owner of the data
does not need to trust the cloud software provider or the hard-
ware vendor. Homomorphic encryption schemes rely on well-
studied mathematical hardness assumptions, i.e. if there is a
polynomial time algorithm for breaking the encryption then
there is also a polynomial time algorithm for solving these hard
mathematical problems. Other cryptographic solutions such
as Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [29, 30] require
complicated trust models and typically have larger communi-
cation costs. Non-cryptographic technologies such as secure
enclaves [24] (such as Intel SGX [18]) requires one to trust a
hardware vendor.
Of course, there is no free lunch: FHE is usually consid-
ered impractical due to its performance overhead. However,
recent advances in FHE schemes and implementations dramat-
ically improve performance, which makes many applications
practical today. For example, initial FHE schemes [22] only
operated on bits, requiring logic circuits to perform arithmetic.
Modern FHE schemes [10, 20, 16] organically support integer
and fixed-precision arithmetic dramatically reducing the size
of the circuits required. Similarly, optimized implementations
of FHE schemes such as [27] have further reduced the cost of
performing individual FHE operations.
Despite these improvements, FHE operations are still sev-
eral orders of magnitude slower than their plaintext counter-
parts. Nevertheless, certain privacy-sensitive applications are
willing to pay the cost. For instance, a bank based in Europe
is unlikely to use secure enclaves for sensitive computation as
that requires trusting Intel, an US company. For such appli-
cations, it is important to build FHE applications that are as
efficient as feasible, despite plaintext overhead.
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Today, building an efficient FHE application still requires
manual and error-prone work. FHE encryption schemes usu-
ally require a careful setting of encryption parameters that
trade off performance and security. Moreover, current FHE
schemes introduce noise when operating on encrypting data.
Managing the growth of this noise while satisfying the preci-
sion requirements of the application currently requires labo-
rious effort from the developer. Also, popular FHE schemes
support vectorized operations (called batching in the FHE liter-
ature) with very large vector sizes (of thousands). Application
efficiency crucially relies on maximizing the parallelism avail-
able in the application to use the vector capabilities. Lastly,
FHE schemes limit the operations allowed in an application
(i.e., no branches or control flow) and thus require a devel-
oper to creatively structure their program to work around such
limitations.
In many respects, programming FHE applications directly
on FHE schemes today is akin to low-level assembly program-
ming on modern architectures. Our central hypothesis behind
this paper is future FHE applications will benefit from a com-
piler and runtime that targets a compact and well-reasoned
interface, which we call the Homomorphic Instruction Set
Architecture (HISA). Just as the hardware ISA interface en-
abled hardware advances to proceed independent of software
advances in the compiler and language runtimes, we posit that
HISA isolates future advances in FHE schemes from the com-
piler optimizations and runtime improvements for supporting
FHE applications.
To demonstrate and evaluate the utility behind such an in-
terface, this paper focuses on the task of fully-homomorphic
deep-neural network (DNN) inference. This application is
particularly suited as the first domain of study. First, the
DNN inference computation does not involve discrete control
flow which is a perfect match for FHE. While DNN inference
involve non-polynomial activation functions, they can be effec-
tively replaced with polynomail approximations [23, 13]. The
ability of DNNs to tolerate errors provides us the flexibility of
quantizing and reducing the precision of the computation for
performance.
This paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first
compiler and runtime called CHET for developing FHE DNN
inference. CHET guarantees sound semantics by selecting the
right encryption parameters that maximize performance while
guaranteeing security and application-intended precision of
the computed results. CHET builds on the recent encyrption
scheme [16] that provides approximate arithmetic to emulate
fixed-point arithmetic required for DNN inference. Finally,
CHET explores a large space of optimization choices, such
as the multiple ways to pack data into ciphertexts as well as
multiple ways to implement computational kernels for each
layout, that are currently done manually by experts today.
In addition to a compiler, CHET includes a runtime, akin
to the linear algebra libraries used in unencrypted evaluation
of neural networks. We have developed a set of layouts and
a unified metadata representation for them. For these new
layouts we have developed a set of computational kernels that
implement the common operations found in convolutional
neural networks (CNNs). All of these kernels were designed
to use the SIMD-style capabilities of modern FHE schemes.
We evaluate CHET with a set of real-world CNN mod-
els and show how different optimization choices available in
our compiler can significantly improve latencies. We further
demonstrate how the optimized kernel implementations in
CHET allow neural networks of unprecedented depth to be
homomorphically evaluated.
In summary our main contributions are as follows:
• A homomorphic instruction set architecture (HISA) that
cleanly abstracts and exposes features of FHE libraries.
• A set of tiled layouts and a metadata format for packing
tensors into ciphertexts.
• Novel kernel implementations of homomorphic tensor oper-
ations.
• A compiler and runtime for homomorphic evaluation of
tensor programs, known as CHET.
• An evaluation of CHET on a set of real-world CNN models,
including the homomorphic evaluation of the deepest CNN
to date.
2. Background
This Section provides a concise background of homomorphic
encryption with of its limitations and capabilities, followed by
a brief introduction into tensor programs.
2.1. Homomorphic Encryption
We will begin by describing the properties of leveled fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) that are essential for a pro-
grammer. We first introduce general concepts followed by a
description of the HEAAN scheme [16], which is used in our
evaluations.
Leveled FHE can evaluate an arithmetic circuit of a pre-
determined multiplicative depth L. The reason for such a
restriction is that typically in homomorphic encryption each
ciphertext carries a inherent “noise” which increases when
computations are performed. Once the noise reaches a certain
bound the ciphertext becomes corrupted and the message can-
not be recovered anymore, even with the correct decryption
key. In Leveled FHE, the parameters of the encryption scheme
are chosen so that the noise remains below this threshold for
circuits of depth up to the chosen value L. Unfortunately, due
to the increase in the parameters of the scheme, the complexity
of each homomorphic operation also grows with L.
Encryption Keys: FHE schemes have two sets of keys: public
keys and private keys. Private keys are used for decryption
and public keys are used for encryption and in homomorphic
operations. As long as a user does not reveal their private
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key, FHE schemes leak no information about the user’s data.1
Public keys, on the other hand, are meant to be shared for
secure computation.
Supported Operations: Existing FHE schemes on integers
support only two basic algebraic operations: addition and
multiplication. The operands can be any combination of ci-
phertexts and plaintexts. Techniques for fixed point operands
are discussed later in this Section. However, all other op-
erations need to be approximated in terms of additions and
multiplications. For example, functions such as exp, log, and
tanh can be approximated by polynomials using Taylor expan-
sion. On the other hand, branching is not possible in FHE and
the only possible solution is executing all cases and masking
the result.
Noise and Multiplicative Depth: We denote the amount of
noise associated with ciphertext α by noise(α). The amount
of noise for a ciphertext depends on its operands and the op-
erator and excessive noise completely destroys the encrypted
message. Any freshly encrypted value has a small amount of
noise. For any given ciphertexts, α and β and plaintext c, the
noise contribution is roughly as follows:
• noise(α× c)≈ noise(α+ c)≈ noise(α)
• noise(α+β )≈max{noise(α),noise(β )}
• noise(α×β )≈max{noise(α),noise(β )}·r
where r is a constant number that depends on parameter se-
lection of the encryption. The multiplicative noise increase
between two ciphertexts greatly affects the design of a FHE
computation. Multiplicative depth of a ciphertext α is the max-
imum number of ciphertext multiplications that contributed
to the computation of α and they are all a part of a chain.
For example, for ciphertext α = β ∗ (γ ∗ γ+a+λ ) where β ,
γ and λ are ciphertexts and a is a plaintext, the multiplica-
tive depth is 2. For a multiplicative depth of L, the noise is
O(rL). The maximum noise tolerance can be adjusted by the
encryption parameters but that negatively impacts computa-
tional complexity of operations. Therefore, it is crucial to keep
the multiplicative depth minimal to avoid the costs.
Floating Point: Due to the nature of the homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes, it is not easy to support floating point operations.
Instead, we can use fixed point arithmetic by combining in-
tegers with a scaling factor. To avoid accumulating scaling
factor, fixed point arithmetic requires scaling the result down
after each multiplication. However, the BFV/BGV schemes
do not support division, and hence applications using these
schemes will see an accumulation of scaling factors. This
requires increasing space to store the intermediate results, and
the required encryption parameters becomes exponential in the
multiplicative depth of the circuit, which makes deep circuit
evaluations infeasible. Section 2.2 gives background on an
approximate encryption scheme that avoids this problem.
FHE Vectorization: FHE multiplication and addition are ex-
tremely costly and usually not practical if one pair of operands
1Encryption schemes in general base their security on the hardness of
some underlying problem, e.g., learning with errors [28].
are considered at a time. Fortunately, in the BFV [20],
BGV [10] and HEAAN schemes, multiple ciphertexts can
be packed into a single ciphertext to benefit from Single In-
struction Multiple Data (SIMD) parallelism [21]. This tech-
nique allows packing multiple plaintext values into a single
ciphertext. Given two α and β , that encode the plaintext vec-
tors (a1,a2, . . . ,an) and (b1,b2, . . . ,bn), respectively, α×β or
α+β correspond to elementwise multiplication and addition
of the underlying individual ai and bi. Similar to shuffling
instructions in the SIMD units of modern processors, the ele-
ments of a vector can be rotated in a packed ciphertext. How-
ever, random access is not directly supported. Instead random
access can be implemented by multiplying with a plaintext
mask, followed by a rotation. This unfortunately introduces
additional multiplicative depth and should thus be avoided if
possible.
Bootstrapping: True Fully Homomorphic Encryption starts
with a Leveled FHE scheme and introduces an additional noise
management technique traditionally referred to as bootstrap-
ping. Bootstrapping reduces noise, and when performed fre-
quently enough it allows in principle an unlimited number of
operations to be performed. A recent work by Cheon et al. [15]
describes a bootstrapping algorithm for the HEAAN [16]
scheme, and best results takes about 1 second to bootstrap
a single number. Therefore, we leave using bootstrapping for
future work once it is more practical.
2.2. HEAAN
There are a few state-of-the-art leveled FHE schemes, for
example the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuthanathan scheme [10]
and the Fan-Vercauteren variant of the Brakerski scheme [20],
which we will refer to as BGV and BFV. These two schemes
are similar in many aspects. In particular, both scheme sup-
ports vector plaintext type Fk where F is some finite field, and
vectorized additions/multiplications. More recently, Cheon et
al. proposed the HEAAN scheme [16], which supports better
approximate computation over encrypted data.
The HEAAN scheme uses a novel idea to mix the encryp-
tion noise with the message. Then, one can use the modulus
switching techniques for BGV scheme to achieve the function-
ality of “scaling down”, i.e., given an encryption of m and a
public integer K, output an encryption of m/K+ ε for some
ε > 0 of fixed size. This gives the ability to control the scaling
factor and hence the precision throughout the homomorphic
circuit evaluation, and allows encryption parameters that are
linear in multiplicative depth. However, the HEAAN scheme
only supports approximate computations: first, even a freshly
encrypted ciphertext decrypts to a perturbed message; also,
homomorphic operations insert noise into the result. There-
fore, one needs to carefully control these noises in order to
maintain a desired precision of the computation output.
In the HEAAN scheme, two operations require additional
public key materials. After each multiplication between cipher-
texts, the output ciphertext is actually larger than the two input
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ciphertexts, and it’s common to run an operation called re-
linearization to reduce the size of output. Both re-linearization
and rotation require certain evaluation keys. These keys can
be generated from the secret key, and each rotation key can
perform rotation by a fixed amount. In the public implementa-
tion of HEAAN, by default only power-of-2 rotation keys are
generated, and general rotations are written as a composition
of power-of-2 rotations. This presents an interesting problem
of choosing the best rotation keys for a given program, which
balances evaluation time with storage/communication costs of
additional rotation keys.
To instantiate the HEAAN scheme, we need to select two
integer parameters N (the degree of polynomial modulus, a
power of 2) and Q (the ciphertext modulus). The security of
the scheme is based on the ring learning-with-errors problem,
and for a fixed Q, the security level increases with N. One
additional complication is: the noise generated by each ho-
momorphic operation increases with N, which could increase
required precision and thus Q, possibly requiring a larger N
than the initial guess.
The number of elements that can be packed into a single
ciphertext scales linearly with the parameter N. In particular,
HEAAN supports encrypting N/2 complex numbers in a sin-
gle ciphertext. We note that the vector encryption in HEAAN
comes with an additional encoding error, i.e., even a fresh
encoding of a vector will lose some precision of the input
due to a rounding process. In HEAAN, the encoding error is
O(
√
N), hence we need to scale up the input numbers to make
sure they are sufficiently larger compared to this error.
2.3. Tensor Programs
A tensor is a multidimensional array with regular dimensions.
A tensor t has a data type dtype(t), which defines the repre-
sentation of each element, and a shape shape(t), which is a
list of the tensor’s dimensions. For example, a single 32 by
32 image with 3 channels of color values between 0 and 255
could be represented by a tensor I with dtype(I) = int8 and
shape(I) = [3,32,32].
In machine learning, neural networks are commonly ex-
pressed as programs operating on tensors. Some common
tensor operations in neural networks include:
Convolution calculates a cross correlation between an input
and a filter tensor.
Matrix multiplication is used to represent neurons that are
connected to all inputs, which are found in dense layers
typically at the end of a convolutional neural network.
Pooling combines adjacent elements using a reduction opera-
tion such as maximum or average.
Elementwise operations such as ReLUs and batch normal-
ization.
Reshaping reiterprets the shape of a tensor, for example, to
flatten preceding a matrix multiplication.
Tensor programs are used as models for large datasets in
regression and classification tasks. To define a space of models
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Figure 1: Overview of the CHET system at compile-time.
some constant tensors in the program are designated as train-
able weights. Since operations are differentiable (almost every-
where), backpropagation can be used to update weights. This
is used as a step in an optimization algorithm, e.g., stochastic
gradient descent.
Tensor programs have attractive properties for execution
on homomorphic encryption: typically no branching, very
regular data access patterns making vectorization possible. We
consider the tensor program as a circuit of tensor operations
and this circuit is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG).
3. Software Stack for Homomorphic Evaluation
of Tensor Programs
There are many open problems in building a full software stack
for FHE applications and the systems, OS, and PL community
can help bridge the gap between an application programmer
and the underlying crypto library that implements secure prim-
itives. This section presents an overview of an end-to-end
software stack for evaluating tensor programs on homomor-
phically encrypted data. The target architecture for this stack
is a Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme and our
tensor compiler, CHET, interacts with this scheme using the
Homomorphic Instruction Set Architecture (HISA) defined in
Section 4. At the top of stack rests the user-provided tensor
program or circuit. CHET consists of a compiler and runtime
to bridge the gap in-between them. We describe the runtime
and the compiler in detail in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.
In this Section, we present an overview of the end-to-end
software stack.
Figure 1 shows the overview of the CHET compiler. In
addition to the tensor circuit, CHET requires the schema of
the input and weights to the circuit. The schema specifies the
dimensions of the tensors as well the floating-point precision
required of the values in those tensors. CHET also requires
the desired floating-point precision of the output of the circuit.
Using these constraints, CHET generates an equivalent, op-
timized homomorphic tensor circuit as well as an encryptor
and decryptor. Both of these executables encode the choices
made by the compiler to make the homomorphic computation
efficient.
To evaluate the tensor circuit on an image, the client first
generates a private key and encrypts the image using the en-
cryptor (which can also generate private keys) provided by the
compiler, as shown in Figure 2. The encrypted image is then
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Figure 2: Overview of the CHET system at runtime.
sent to the server along with unencrypted weights and pub-
lic keys required for evaluating homomorphic operations (i.e.,
multiplication and rotation). The server executes the optimized
homomorphic tensor circuit generated by the CHET compiler.
The homomorphic tensor operations in the circuit are exe-
cuted using the CHET runtime, which uses an underlying FHE
scheme to execute homomorphic computations on encrypted
data. The circuit produces an encrypted prediction, which it
then sends to the client. The client decrypts the encrypted
prediction with its private keys using the compiler generated
decryptor. In this way, the client runs tensor programs like
neural networks on the server without the server being privy
to the data, the output (prediction), or any intermediate state.
While Figure 2 presents the flow in CHET for homo-
morphically evaluating a tensor program on a single image,
CHET supports evaluating the program on multiple images si-
multaneously, which is known as batching in image inference.
Batching increases the throughput of image inference. In con-
trast, CHET ’s focus is decreasing image inference latency. In
the rest of this paper, we consider a batch size of 1, although
CHET trivially supports larger batch sizes.
The FHE scheme exposes several policies or heuristics such
as the encryption parameters. Similarly, the CHET runtime
also exposes several policies that could be specific to or inde-
pendent of the FHE scheme. This is analogous to Intel MKL
libraries having different implementations of the same oper-
ation, where the most performant implementation depends
on the size of the input or the target architecture. In the case
of homomorphic computation, these policies not only affect
performance but can also affect security and accuracy. A
key design principle of CHET is the separation of concern
between the policies of choosing the secure, accurate, and
most efficient homomorphic operation from the mechanisms
of executing those policies. Some of these policies are inde-
pendent of the input or weights schema, so they are entrusted
to the CHET runtime. On the other hand, most policies may
require either the input or weights schema or global analysis
of the program. In such cases, the CHET compiler chooses
the appropriate policy and the CHET runtime implements the
mechanisms for that policy. We describe the policies explored
and mechanisms exposed by the CHET runtime (Section 5)
and then describe how the CHET compiler (Section 6) chooses
the appropriate policy.
4. Homomorphic Instruction Set Architecture
This section introduces a design for a Homomorphic Instruc-
tion Set Architecture (HISA), that provides a useful interface
to fully homomorphic encryption libraries. We have designed
the HISA with the following objectives in mind:
• Abstract details of HE schemes, such as use of evaluation
keys and management of moduli.
• Provide a common interface to shared functionality in FHE
libraries, while exposing unique features.
• Not to include the complexity of plaintext evaluation. In-
stead the HISA is intended to be embedded into a host
language.
The HISA is split into multiple profiles and all libraries are
expected to implement at least the Encryption profile. Each
FHE library implementing the HISA provides two types, pt
for plaintexts and ct for ciphertexts, and additional ones de-
pending on the profiles implemented by the library.
Figure 3 presents instructions available in the HISA. The
Encryption profile provides core functionality for encryption,
decryption, and memory management. Usage of encryption
and evaluation keys is left as a responsibility of FHE libraries
and is not exposed in the HISA.
The Integers profile provides operations for encoding and
computing on integers. The profile covers both FHE schemes
with batched encodings and ones without by having a config-
urable number of slots s, which is provided as an additional
parameter during initialization of the FHE library.
The Division profile exposes extra functionality provided by
the HEAAN family of encryption schemes. For libraries imple-
menting the base HEAAN scheme [16], maxScalarDiv(c,ub)
will return the largest power-of-two d such that d ≤ ub and
d ≤ q, where q is the modulus of c. For a variation of HEAAN
based on residue number systems (RNS) [7], on the other
hand, maxScalarDiv(c,ub) would return the largest coprime
modulus of c less than ub, or 1 if there is none. This way the
Division profile cleanly exposes the division functionality of
both variants of the HEAAN encryption scheme.
The Relin profile provides the capability to separate mul-
tiplication from re-linearization. While re-linearization is se-
mantically a no-op, it is useful to expose relinearize calls to
the compiler, as their proper placement is a highly non-trivial
(in fact NP-complete) problem [14].
Finally, the Bootstrap profile exposes bootstrapping in FHE
libraries that support it. While bootstrapping is semantically
a no-op, it must be exposed in the HISA because selection of
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Instruction Signature Semantics Profile
encrypt(p) pt→ ct Encrypt plaintext p into a ciphertext. Encryption
decrypt(c) ct→ pt Decrypt ciphertext c into a plaintext. Encryption
copy(c) ct→ ct Make a copy of ciphertext c. Encryption
free(h) ct∪pt→ void Free any resources associated with handle h. Encryption
encode(m) Zs→ pt Encode vector of integers m into a plaintext. Integers
decode(p) pt→ Zs Decode plaintext p into a vector of integers. Integers
rotLeft(c,x), rotLeftAssign(c,x) ct,Z→ ct Rotate ciphertext c left x slots. Integers
rotRight(c,x), rotRightAssign(c,x) ct,Z→ ct Rotate ciphertext c right x slots. Integers
add(c,c′),addAssign(c,c′) ct,ct→ ct
Add ciphertext, plaintext, or scalar to ciphertext c.
Integers
addPlain(c, p),addPlainAssign(c, p) ct,pt→ ct Integers
addScalar(c,x),addScalarAssign(c,x) ct,Z→ ct Integers
sub(c,c′),subAssign(c,c′) ct,ct→ ct Subtract ciphertext, plaintext, or scalar from ciphertext
c.
Integers
subPlain(c, p),subPlainAssign(c, p) ct,pt→ ct Integers
subScalar(c,x),subScalarAssign(c,x) ct,Z→ ct Integers
mul(c,c′),mulAssign(c,c′) ct,ct→ ct Multiply ciphertext c with ciphertext, plaintext, or
scalar.
Integers
mulPlain(c, p),mulPlainAssign(c, p) ct,pt→ ct Integers
mulScalar(c,x),mulScalarAssign(c,x) ct,Z→ ct Integers
divScalar(c,x),divScalarAssign(c,x) ct,Z→ ct Divide ciphertext c with scalar x. Undefined if x 6=
maxScalarDiv(c,ub) for some ub ∈ Z.
Division
maxScalarDiv(c,ub) ct,Z→ Z Gives largest valid divisor d s.t. 1≤ d ≤ ub. Division
mulNoRelin(c,c′),mulNoRelinAssign(c,c′) ct,ct→ ct Ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication without re-
linearization.
Relin
relinearize(c) ct→ void No-op, FHE library performs re-linearization. Relin
bootstrap(c) ct→ void No-op, FHE library performs bootstrapping. Bootstrap
Figure 3: Instructions of the HISA
encryption parameters depends on when bootstrapping is per-
formed. Furthermore, the optimal placement of bootstrapping
operations [8] depends on the program being evaluated: “wide”
programs with a lot of concurrent should bootstrap at lower
depths than “narrow” programs that are mostly sequential.
The HISA may be implemented either with precise or ap-
proximate semantics. With approximate semantics all opera-
tions that return a pt or ct may introduce an error term. It
is expected that this error is from some random distribution
which may be bounded given a confidence level. However,
the HISA does not offer instructions for estimating the error,
as we expect these estimates to be required during selection
of fixed point precisions and encryption parameters. Instead
we recommend that approximate FHE libraries provide imple-
mentations of the HISA with no actual encryption and either:
a way to query safe estimates of errors accumulated in each
pt and ct, or sampling of error from the same distribution as
encrypted evaluation would produce. Both approaches may be
used by a compiler for selecting fixed point precisions. The
sampling approach is more flexible for applications where it
is hard to quantify acceptable bounds for error, such as neural
network classification, where only maintaining the order of
results matters.
Initialization of FHE libraries is concerns that falls outside
of the HISA, and is specific to the encryption and encoding
scheme used. This step will include at least generating or
importing encryption and evaluation keys. FHE libraries im-
plementing leveled encryption schemes also require selecting
encryption parameters that are large enough to allow the com-
putation to succeed. Such FHE libraries should provide analy-
sis passes as additional implementations of the HISA to help
with parameter selection. We have implemented such a pass
for the HEAAN library [16], which we present in Section 6.
HISA is not an IR: The HISA does not and nor is it meant
to provide a unified interface to FHE libraries. To draw a
parallel to processors implementing the x86 instruction set, if
a program includes instructions from Advanced Vector Exten-
sions (AVX) then that program will not run on any processor
bought before 2011. Conversely, running a program that does
not use AVX on a processor that does may be leaving a lot
of potential performance unused. Similarly, a program us-
ing the Division HISA profile will only run on FHE libraries
implementing a HEAAN style encryption scheme [16] and
again, conversely, a program using HEAAN for fixed point
arithmetic without ever calling divScalar would likely achieve
much better performance (through smaller encryption parame-
ters). The role of a unified interface should instead be played
by an intermediate representation (IR). For the HISA, this
IR would include fixed point datatypes and specifications of
required precisions. This kind of an IR could then be lowered
to target FHE libraries that support different subsets of profiles.
This is similar to how for example the LLVM intermediate
representation can be lowered both to processors that support
AVX and ones that do not.
6
5. Runtime for Executing Homomorphic Tensor
Operations
Intel MKL libraries provide efficient implementations of
BLAS operations. In the same way, we design the CHET run-
time to provide efficient implementations for homomorphic
tensor primitives. While the interface for BLAS and tensor
operations are well-defined, the interface for a tensor operation
on encrypted data is not apparent because the encrypted data
is an encryption of a vector, whereas the tensor operation is
on higher-dimensional tensors. The types need to be recon-
ciled to define a clean interface. In the rest of this section, we
consider a 4-dimensional tensor (batch, channel, height, and
width dimensions) to illustrate this, but the same concepts ap-
ply to other higher-dimensional tensors. We first describe our
cipher tensor datatype. Each tensor operation on unencrypted
tensors corresponds to an equivalent homomorphic tensor op-
eration on cipher tensor(s) and plain tensor(s), if any. We then
briefly describe implementations of some homomorphic tensor
operations using this clean interface and datatype.
5.1. Cipher Tensor Datatype:
A naive way to encode a 4-d tensor as a vector is to lay out all
elements in the tensor contiguously in the vector and encrypt
it. This approach may not be feasible for a few reasons: (i) the
vector size is determined by the encryption parameters (like
N in HEAAN) and the 4-d tensor might not fit in the vector,
or (ii) tensor operations like convolution and matrix multi-
plication on this input vector (or to produce such an output
vector) become complicated and very inefficient because only
point-wise operations or rotations are supported by the HISA.
Another option is to encrypt each inner dimension (width)
element in a separate cipher. This creates a vector of vec-
tors, where the inner vector is a cipher and the outer vector
contiguously stores pointers to these ciphers. The number of
homomorphic operations would increase significantly because
a cipher operation may be required for each element, thereby
not utilizing the vector width and making it very inefficient.
The problem of encoding a 4-d tensor as a vector of vectors
is similar to tiling or blocking the data but with constraints
that differ from that of locality. For example, a 4-d tensor can
be blocked as a 2-d tensor of 2-d tensors. This corresponds
to the 4-d tensor being laid out as a vector of vectors, where
each inner vector has the inner two dimensions (height and
width) encrypted. Similar issues as stated earlier may arise
if a particular data layout is fixed. Some tensor operations
might be more efficient in some layouts than in others. More
importantly, the most efficient layout may be dependent on
the schema of the tensor or on future tensor operations, so
determining that is best left to the compiler. Thus, we want
a uniform cipher tensor datatype that is parametric to differ-
ent data layouts, so that the CHET compiler can choose the
appropriate data layout.
Some tensor operations enforce more constraints on the
cipher tensor datatype, primarily for performance reasons.
For example, to perform convolution with same padding, the
input 4-d tensor is expected to be padded. Such a padding
on unencrypted data is trivial, but adding such padding to
an encrypted cipher on-the-fly involves several rotation and
point-wise multiplication operations. Similarly, a reshape of
the tensor is trivial on unencrypted data but very inefficient on
encrypted data. All these constraints arise because using only
point-wise operations or rotations on the vector may be highly
inefficient to perform certain tensor operations. Therefore,
the cipher tensor datatype needs to allow padding or logical
re-shaping without changing the elements of the tensor.
To satisfy these requirements, we define an cipher tensor
datatype, that we term CipherTensor, as a vector of ciphertexts
(vectors) with associated metadata that captures the way to
interpret the vector of ciphertexts as the corresponding unen-
crypted tensor. The metadata includes: (i) physical dimensions
of the (outer) vector and those of the (inner) ciphertext, (ii) log-
ical dimensions of the equivalent unencrypted tensor, and (iii)
physical strides for each dimension of the (inner) ciphertext.
The metadata is stored as plain integers and can be modified
easily. Nevertheless, the metadata does not leak any informa-
tion about the data because it is agnostic to the values of the
tensor and is solely reliant on the schema or dimensions of the
tensor. The metadata can be used to satisfy all the required
constraints of the datatype:
• The metadata are parameters that the compiler can choose
to instantiate and use a specific data layout. For example,
blocking or tiling the inner dimension (height and width) of
a 4-d tensor corresponds to choosing 2 dimensions for the
(outer) vector and 2 dimensions for the (inner) ciphertext,
where the logical dimensions match the physical dimen-
sions. We term this as HW-tiling. Another option is to block
the channel dimension too, such that multiple, but not all,
channels may be in a cipher. This corresponds to choosing
2 dimensions for the (outer) vector and 3 dimensions for
the (inner) ciphertext with only 4 logical dimensions. We
term this as CHW-tiling.
• The physical strides of each dimension can be specified
to include sufficient padding in-between elements of that
dimension. For example, for an image of height (row) and
width (column) of 28, a stride of 1 for the width dimension
and a stride of 30 for the height dimension allows a padding
of 2 (zero or invalid) elements between the rows.
• Reshaping the cipher tensor only involves updating the
metadata to change the logical dimensions and does not
perform any homomorphic operations.
5.2. Homomorphic Tensor Operations:
The interface for a homormorphic tensor operation is mostly
similar to that of its unencrypted tensor operation counterpart,
except that the types are replaced with cipher tensors or plain
tensors, which we call CipherTensor and PlainTensor, respec-
tively. The homomorphic tensor operation also exposes the
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Algorithm 1: HW-Tiled Homomorphic Convolution 2-d
of a 4-d tensor (with valid padding)
Input :CipherTensor input
Input :PlainTensor filter
Output :CipherTensor output
1 foreach [b, oc] in output.getOuterDims() do
2 output.ciphers[b, oc] = zeroCipher
3 foreach ic in input.getChannelDims() do
4 hStride, wStride = input.getCipherStrides()
5 foreach [fh, fw] in filter.getHeightWidth() do
6 weight = filter[fh, fw, ic, oc]
7 weightFP = FixedPrecision(weight, plainLogP)
8 rotate = fh * hStride + fw * wStride
9 temp = input.ciphers[b, ic]
10 FHE.rotLeftAssign(temp, rotate)
11 FHE.mulScalarAssign(temp, weightFP)
12 FHE.addAssign(output.ciphers[b, oc], temp)
13 end
14 end
15 FHE.divScalarAssign(output.ciphers[b, oc], plainLogP)
16 end
output CipherTensor in the interface as a pass-by-reference
parameter. This enables the compiler to specify the data layout
of both the input and output CipherTensors. In addition, the
interface exposes parameters to specify the scaling factors to
use for the input CipherTensor(s) and PlainTensor(s), if any.
When a compiler specifies all these parameters, it chooses an
implementation specialized for this specification. There might
be multiple implementations for the same specification that
are tuned for specific FHE libraries (for those that have divS-
calar and for those that do not). In such cases, the compiler
also chooses the implementation to use. Nevertheless, there
are several algorithm choices for a given specification that have
significant impact on the performance of the operation. These
could be quite involved (similar to MKL implementations).
We explore some of these briefly next.
HW-tiled Homomorphic Convolution 2-d with VALID
padding : Consider a HW-tiled CipherTensor that repre-
sents a 4-d tensor. Algorithm 1 shows pseudocode for a 2-d
convolution with valid padding of this CipherTensor into an-
other HW-tiled CipherTensor. Zeros (of the size of the cipher-
text) encrypted into a ciphertext is assumed to be available.
In convolution, the first element in a HW cipher needs to be
added with some of its neighboring elements and before the
addition, each of these elements need to be multiplied with
different filter weights. To do so, we can left rotate each of
these neighboring elements to the same position as the first el-
ement. Rotating the ciphertext vector in such a way moves the
position appropriately for all HW elements. For each rotated
vector, the same weight needs to be multiplied for all HW
elements, so mulScalar of the ciphertext is sufficient. Before
multiplication, the filter weight needs to be scaled using the
compiler-provided scaling factor (plainLogP). These cipher-
text vectors can then be added for different input channels to
produce a ciphertext for an output channel. The rotations of
the input ciphertexts are invariant to the output batch and chan-
nel, so they can be code motioned out in the implementation
to reduce the number of rotations (omitted in the pseudocode
for the sake of exposition).
HW-tiled Homomorphic Convolution 2-d with SAME
padding : If a similar 2-d convolution has to be imple-
mented, but with same padding, then each HW ciphertext
is expected to be padded by the compiler so that the amount to
rotate (left or right) varies but the number of rotations remain
the same. However, after one convolution, there are invalid ele-
ments where the padded zeros existed earlier because those are
added to the neighboring elements as well. The runtime keeps
track of this using an additional metadata on the CipherTen-
sor. The next time a convolution (or some other operation)
is called on the CipherTensor, if the CipherTensor contains
invalid elements where zeros are expected to be present, then
the implementation can mask out all invalid elements with
one mulPlain operation (the plaintext vector contains 1 where
valid elements exist and 0 otherwise). This not only increases
the time for the convolution operation, but it also increases the
modulus Q required because divScalar may need to be called
after such a masking operation. For security reasons, a larger
Q can increase the N that needs to be used during encryption,
thereby increasing the cost of all homomorphic operations.
CHW-tiled Homormorphic Convolution 2-d : Let us now
consider a CHW-tiled CipherTensor that represents a 4-d ten-
sor. To perform a 2-d convolution on this, even with VALID
padding, mulPlain is required because different weights need
to be multiplied to different channels that are all in the same
cipher. In some FHE libraries like HEAAN, the asymptotic
complexity of mulPlain is much higher than that of mulScalar,
thereby increasing the cost of the convolution operation. More-
over, after multiplication, the multiple input channels in the
ciphertext need to be summed up into a single output channel.
Such a reduction can be done by rotating every channel to
the position of the first one in the ciphertext and adding them
up one by one. If C is the number of channels in the cipher,
this involves C−1 rotations. However, such a reduction can
be done more efficiently by exploiting the fact that the stride
between the input channels is the same. This requires at the
most 2log(C) rotations with additions in-between rotations,
similar to vectorized reduction on unencrypted data. To pro-
duce an output ciphertext with multiple channels C, the input
ciphertext needs to be replicated C−1 times. Instead of C−1
rotations serially, this can also be done in 2log(C) rotations,
by adding the ciphertexts in-between.
Homomorphic matmul : Different FHE operations have
different latencies. Although rotLeft and mulPlain have simi-
lar algorithmic complexity in HEAAN, the constants may vary
and we observe that, mulPlain is more expensive than rotLeft.
Due to this, it may be worth trading multiplications for rota-
tions. This trade-off is most evident in homormorphic matmul
operation. The number of mulPlain required reduce propor-
tional to the number of replicas of the data we can add in the
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Figure 4: Overview of an analysis and transformation pass in
the CHET compiler.
same cipher. Adding replicas increase the number of rotations
but decrease the number of multiplications. This yields much
more benefit because replicas can be added in log number of
rotations instead of the linear number of multiplications.
6. Compiler For Transforming Homomorphic
Tensor Operations
In this section, we describe the CHET compiler, which is a
critical component of the end-to-end software stack to ho-
momorphically evaluate tensor programs. The compiler is
responsible for generating an optimized homomorphic tensor
circuit that not only produces accurate results but also guar-
antees security of the data being computed. We describe the
analysis and transformation framework used by the CHET
compiler and then use this framework to describe a few trans-
formations that are required for accuracy and security, and
a few optimizations that improve performance significantly.
We present the analysis and transformations specifically for
HEAAN but it can extended for other FHE libraries trivially.
6.1. Analysis and transformation framework
In contrast to most traditional optimizing compilers, the input
tensor circuit has two key properties that the CHET compiler
can exploit: the data flow graph is a Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG) and the tensor dimensions are known at compile-time
from the schema provided by the user (similar to High Per-
formance Fortran compilers). The CHET compiler must also
analyze multiple data flow graphs corresponding to different
implementations. Fortunately, the design space is not that
large and we can explore it exhaustively, one at a time.
The CHET compiler only needs to determine the policy to
execute homomorphic computation while the CHET runtime
handles the mechanisms of efficient execution. This separa-
tion of concerns simplifies the code generation tasks of the
compiler but it could complicate the analysis required. The
compiler generates high-level homomorphic tensor operations
but needs to analysis the low-level HISA instructions exe-
cuted. To resolve this, we exploit the CHET runtime directly
to perform the analysis.
Figure 4 shows the flow of a single analysis and transfor-
mation pass in the compiler. The transformer is a simple tool
that specifies the parameters to use in the homomorphic ten-
sor circuit (the input tensor circuit is directly mapped to an
equivalent homomorphic tensor circuit with parameters left
unspecified). This transformed homomorphic tensor circuit
can be symbolically executed using the CHET runtime. This
would execute the same HISA instructions that would be ex-
ecuted at runtime because the tensor dimensions are known.
Instead of executing these HISA instructions using the FHE
scheme, the HISA instructions invoke the symoblic analyser.
This tracks the data that flows through the circuit. Repeated
iteration to a fix-point is not needed since the circuit is a DAG.
The DAG is unrolled on-the-fly to dynamically track the data
flow, without having to construct an explicit DAG. Different
analysers can track different information flows. The analyser
returns its results as the output of the symoblic execution.
The transformer then uses these results to instantiate a new,
transformed specification of the homomorphic tensor circuit.
6.2. Parameter Selection
To choose encryption parameters such that the output is accu-
rate, the compiler needs to analyse the depth of the circuit. In
HEAAN, divScalar consumes modulus Q from the ciphertext
it is called on. The output should have sufficient modulus
Q left to capture accurate results. We implement a symoblic
analyser with a dummy ciphertext datatype that increments
the modulus Q of the input ciphertext and copies into the out-
put ciphertext whenever divScalar is called. All other HISA
instructions only copy the modolus from intput to output. The
modulus Q in the dummy output ciphertext is the depth of
the circuit. The input ciphertext should be encrypted with
modulus Q that is at least the sum of the depth of the circuit
and the desired output precision. This ensures accurate results.
For the input modolus Q, a large enough N must be chosen to
guaratee security of the data. This is a deterministic map from
Q to N. In some cases, Q might require prohibitively large N,
in which case the compiler needs to introduce bootstrapping
in-between. We do not explore this in this paper.
6.3. Padding Selection
This analysis does not need to track the data flow in the HISA
instructions. It requires analysing the metadata in the Ci-
pherTensor that flows through the homomorphic tensor cir-
cuit. This is quite straight-forward. If tensor operations like
convolution need padding, then the previous operations until
the input should maintain that padding. Some tensor opera-
tions may change strides, in which case the padding required
scales by that factor. The input padding (in each ciphertext
dimension) selected is the maximum padding required for any
homomorphic tensor operation in the circuit.
6.4. Optimization: Rotation Keys Selection
By default, HEAAN inserts public evaluation keys for power-
of-2 left and right rotations, and all rotations are performed
using a combination of power-of-2 rotations. The ciphertext
size is N/2, so HEAAN stores 2log(N)−2 rotation keys by
default. The rotation keys consume significant memory, so
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No. of layers
Network Conv FC Act # FP operations
LeNet-5-small 2 2 4 159960
LeNet-5-medium 2 2 4 5791168
LeNet-5-large 2 2 4 21385674
Industrial 5 2 6 -
SqueezeNet-CIFAR 10 0 9 37759754
Figure 5: DNNs used in our evaluation.
this is trade-off between space and performance. By storing
only these keys, any rotation can be performed. However, this
is too conservative. In a given homomorphic tensor circuit,
the distinct slots to rotate would not be in the order of N. We
use the analyser to track the distinct slots to rotate used in
the homomorphic tensor circuit. All rotate HISA instructions
store the constant slots to rotate in the analyser (right rotations
are converted to left rotations) and other HISA instructions are
ignored. The analyser returns the distinct slots to rotate that
were used. The compiler generates the encryptor such that it
would generate evaluation keys for these rotations using the
private key on the client (Figure 2). We do not need power-of-
2 rotation keys and we observe that the rotation keys chosen
by the compiler are a constant factor of log(N).
6.5. Optimization: Data Layout Selection
Different homomorphic operations have different costs, even
within the same FHE scheme. The cost of homomorphic op-
erations could also vary a lot based on small variations of
the scheme. For example, by using a full-RNS variant of the
HEAAN scheme and storing the ciphertexts and plaintexts
in the number-theoretic-transform (NTT) domain, we can de-
crease the complexity of mulPlain* from O(n log(n)) to O(n).
The compiler can encode the cost of each operation either
from asymptotic complexity or from microbenchmarking each
operation. These costs can then be used to decide which imple-
mentation or data layout to choose for a given homomorphic
tensor circuit. The analyser in this case counts the number of
occurrences of each operation and then uses the asymptotic
complexity to determine to the total cost of the circuit. The
transformer creates a homomorphic tensor circuit correspond-
ing to a data layout and gets its cost using the analyser. It
repeats this for different possible data layout options and then
chooses the one with the lowest cost.
7. Evaluation
Our evaluation targets a set of neural network architectures for
image classification tasks described in Figure 5.
LeNet-5-like is a series of networks for the MNIST [3]
dataset. We use three versions with different number of neu-
rons: LeNet-5-small, LeNet-5-medium, and LeNet-5-large.
The largest one matches the one used in the TensorFlow’s
tutorials [5]. These networks have two convolutional layers,
each followed by ReLU activation and max pooling, and two
fully connected layers with a ReLU in between.
Model CHET Hand-written
LeNet-5-small 8 14
LeNet-5-medium 51 140
LeNet-5-large 265 -
Industrial 312 2413
SqueezeNet-CIFAR10 1342 -
Figure 6: Average latency (in seconds) of CHET and hand-
written versions.
Model log(N) log(Q) log(Pc) log(Pp)
LeNet-5-small 14 240 30 16
LeNet-5-medium 14 240 30 16
LeNet-5-large 15 400 40 20
Industrial 16 705 35 25
SqueezeNet-CIFAR10 16 940 30 20
Figure 7: Encryption parameters selected by CHET and the
user-provided precisions for each model.
SqueezeNet-CIFAR is a network for the CIFAR-10
dataset [1] that follows the SqueezeNet [25] architecture.
This version has 4 Fire-modules [4] for a total of 10 convolu-
tional layers.
Industrial is an pretrained HE-compatible network from an
industry partner for a privacy-sensitive image classification
task. We are unable to reveal the details of the network other
than the fact that it has 5 convolutional layers and 2 fully
connected layers.
All networks other than Industrial use ReLUs and max-
pooling, which are not compatible with homomorphic eval-
uation. For these networks, we modified the activation func-
tions to a second-degree polynomial [23, 13]. The key dif-
ference with prior work is that our activation functions are
f (x) = ax2 + bx with learnable parameters a and b. During
the training phase, the DNN adjusts these parameters automat-
ically to appropriately approximate the ReLU function. To
avoid exploding the gradients during training (which usually
happens during the initial parts of training), we initialized a to
zero and clipped the gradients when large. We also replaced
max-pooling with average-pooling.
We trained LeNet-5-large to an accuracy of 0.993, which
matches that of the network in the TensorFlow’s tuto-
rial [5]. For SqueezeNet-CIFAR, we additionally introduce
L2-regularization with a scale of 1×10−5 to improve perfor-
mance. Our resulting accuracy is 0.815 which is close to the
accuracy of 0.84 of the non-HE compatible model. To the best
of our knowledge SqueezeNet-CIFAR is the deepest neural
network that has been homomorphically evaluated.
All experiments were run on a dual socket Intel Xeon E5-
2667v3@3.2GHz with 224 GiB of memory. Hyperthreading
was off for a total of 16 hardware threads. All runtimes are
reported as averages over 20 different images. We present the
average latency of image inference with a batch size of 1.
Comparison with hand-written: Figure 6 compares hand-
written implementations and CHET with all optimizations.
CHET clearly outperforms hand-written implementations. The
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Model HW CHW HW-conv CHW-fcCHW-rest HW-before
LeNet-5-small 8 12 8 8
LeNet-5-medium 82 91 52 51
LeNet-5-large 325 423 270 265
Industrial 330 312 379 381
SqueezeNet-CIFAR 1342 1620 1550 1342
Figure 8: Average latency (in seconds) with different layouts.
Model Unoptimized Optimized
LeNet-5-small 14 8
LeNet-5-medium 73 51
LeNet-5-large 426 265
Industrial 645 312
SqueezeNet-CIFAR 2648 1342
Figure 9: Average latency (in seconds) with and without rota-
tion keys optimization.
hand-written implementations lack some of the optimizations
in the CHET compiler and runtime. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to scale these hand-written implementations to large net-
works like LeNet-5-large and SqueezeNet-CIFAR10, so we do
not have hand-written implementations for these to compare
against.
Parameter Selection: In Figure 7, the last columns show
precision (the number of decimal digits) required for the image
or ciphertext (Pc) and the weights or the plaintext (Pp), that
are provided by the user. The precision provided is used by
the CHET compiler to select the encryption parameters N and
Q. The values of these parameters grow with the depth of
the circuit, as shown in the figure. With these parameters,
CHET generated homomorphic tensor circuits achieve the
same accuracy as the unencrypted circuits. In addition, the
difference between the output values of these circuits is within
the desired precision of the output.
Data Layout Selection: We evaluate four different data
tiling layouts choices for the three largest networks: (i) HW:
each ciphertext has all height and width elements of a single
channel, (ii) CHW: each ciphertext has multiple channels (all
height and width elements of each), (iii) HW-conv and CHW-
rest: same has CHW, but move to HW before each convolution
and back to CHW after each convolution, and (iv) CHW-fc
and HW-before: same as HW, but switch to CHW during
the first fully connected layer and CHW thereafter. Figure 8
presents the average latency of each network for each layout.
We can see that for each network, a different layout provides
the lowest latency. It is very difficult for the user to determine
which is the best data layout and more importantly, it is dif-
ficult to implement each network manually using a different
data layout. This highlights how the compiler should search
the space of possible layouts and kernel implementations for
each program separately, while entrusting the runtime to im-
plement it efficiently. In this case, the compiler chooses the
best performing data layout for each network based on the cost
model of HEAAN.
Rotation Keys Selection: We evaluate the efficacy of our
rotation keys optimization on the three largest networks. Fig-
ure 9 presents the average latencies with the optimization on
or off. The optimization provides significantly improved per-
formance for all networks and should be always used.2 Having
this optimization implemented as an automatic compiler pass
removes the burden of adding proper rotation keys in each
program separately.
8. Related Work
FHE is currently an active area of research. See Acar et al [6]
for more details. Many have observed the need and suitability
of FHE for machine learning tasks. We survey the most related
work below.
Cryptonets [23] was the first tool to demonstrate a fully-
homomorphic inference of a DNN by replacing the (FHE
incompatible) RELU activations with a quadratic function.
They demonstrated an accuracy of 98.95% for MNIST with a
network with two hidden layers, with a latency of 250 seconds
per image. Chabanne et al. [13] improve upon Cryptonets
by using batch normalization [26] to bound the inputs to the
activations into a small interval where the quadratic approx-
imation is valid. They report improvement in accuracy for
MNIST to 99.30% with a network with 6 activation layers.
Our method of retraining the quadratic activation function is
inspired by these works. Our emphasis in this paper is pri-
marily on automating the manual and error-prone hand tuning
required to ensure that the networks are secure, correct, and
efficient.
Bourse et al. [9] use the TFHE library [17] for DNN infer-
ence. TFHE operates on bits and is thus slow for multi-bit
integer arithmetic. To overcome this difficulty, Bourse et al.
instead use a discrete binary neural network (where activa-
tion functions output either -1 or 1) with a hidden layer using
the sign function as the activation. Our goal in this paper is
to build a framework for compiling larger general-purpose
DNNs.
Similarly, Cingulata [12, 2] is a compiler for converting C++
programs into a Boolean circuit, which is then evaluated using
a backend FHE library. Despite various optimizations [11],
this approach is unlikely to scale for large DNNs.
DeepSecure [30] and SecureML [29] use secure multi-party
computation techniques to respectively perform DNN infer-
ence and training. Such techniques employ communication
between multiple entities that are assumed to not collude and
thus do not have the simple trust model of FHE. On the other
hand, such approaches are more flexible in the operations they
can perform and are computationally cheaper.
Finally, prior work [31, 19] have used partially homomor-
phic encryption schemes (which support addition or multipli-
cation of encrypted data but not both) to determine the encryp-
tion schemes to use for different data items so as to execute
2Barring very memory constrained environments.
11
a given program. While they are able to use computationally
efficient schemes, such techniques are not applicable for eval-
uating DNNs that require both multiplication and addition to
be done on the same input.
9. Conclusion
Good abstractions separate concerns to either side of that
abstraction. For example, x86 lets hardware manufacturers
innovate independently of the software developers and com-
piler writers that target that abstraction. Likewise, cuDNN lets
machine learning experts target various hardware implemen-
tations and reap the benefits of new GPU hardware without
changing their software.
This paper introduces such an abstraction for FHE appli-
cations that cleanly abstracts and exposes features of FHE
implementations. We demonstrate a compiler and runtime
that targets FHE tensor programs, evaluate that compiler and
runtime on real-world CNN models, and demonstrate our com-
piler is able to significantly optimize the performance of FHE
tensor programs. Because of these optimizations, this paper
demonstrates the deepest FHE based CNNs to date.
This paper demonstrates the fruitful application of systems
and compiler research for FHE applications. We posit there are
many open problems that such areas can help solve (i.e., com-
piler support that turns expressions into FHE compatible ones,
or more optimization passes specific to encryption parame-
ters). We expect these opportunities excites other researchers
as much as it does the authors.
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